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A B S T R A C T
Support for large scale agricultural investments in Africa has been mainly premised on their employment pro-
spects for local populations. However, despite earlier calls by Tania Li to centre labour in the land grabs debate,
labour is generally invisible in both mainstream policy and academic research. This paper, through a governance
lens, draws attention to the implications of the global land rush on wage labour. In principle, policy frameworks
that emphasise the labour potentials from large-scale land investments also gravitate towards regulations that
seek to facilitate capital accumulation and mitigate negative impacts on communities – congruent with Ghana’s
policy direction. This paper assesses the political-economic context of the legislative gaps in the current gov-
ernance framework for wage labour and large-scale agriculture in Ghana; characterised mainly by absent, il-
lusively present and repressive institutions. It is supported with empirical findings from the nature of farm
workers’ incorporation into a transnational oil palm plantation in Ghana, their struggles over the nature of the
investment, and the political orientation of the existing regulatory institutions. The study calls for policy mea-
sures which address power relations that shape the distribution of benefits from land investments, and also
recognise structural inequalities that exist in and outside of agriculture.
1. Introduction
The past decade has seen an overwhelming amount of literature on
the impacts of transnational agricultural investments in Africa. Much of
the debates have been rooted in theoretical and analytical perspectives
that speak particularly to the land question, leaving labour to its mar-
gins (Gyapong, 2020; Moyo et al., 2012). Thus the many excellent
discussions on land markets, tenure security and property rights to
govern capitalist agriculture (see Aha and Ayitey, 2017; Ayelazuno,
2019; Byerlee and Deininger, 2013). Many studies have also criticised
large scale investments for the negative livelihood implications of dis-
possession (Ampadu, 2013; La Via Campesina, 2013; Levien, 2011;
Margulis et al., 2013a, 2013b; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011; White et al.,
2012). When land deals occur, modifications to land access are visible
in the short term, while labour related impacts may only materialise at
later stages (Cotula et al., 2014) Additionally, full implementation of
land investments occurs at later periods making it methodologically
challenging to study (Oya, 2013a, Oya, 2013).
Even so, with many land deals in their implementation stages, it is
essential to assess labour impacts. It is not to say that land and labour
issues can be, or are researched as entirely distinct aspects of land deals;
instead, their apparent nexus has not received the necessary attention.
Li (2011) admonished that we investigate what translates on the ground
when investors need both land and labour. A few studies have begun to
track the employment implications of large-scale agriculture. Different
agricultural models have different labour implications (Hall et al.,
2017); there are accounts of skill and gendered income distribution and
negative health impacts on farmworkers (O’Laughlin, 2017). Some re-
searchers have reported that regardless of the often low wages, farm-
workers are still attracted to the security of income flows that guar-
antees their access to basic needs (Schoneveld et al., 2011). Most of the
emerging evidence suggest a complexity of issues regarding the amount
of jobs generated, the differentiated inclusion opportnities and job in-
security (Dubb et al., 2016; Gyapong, 2019; Hall et al., 2017; Kay,
2015; Ouma, 2018).
How then should large-scale agricultural investments to be gov-
erned? Borras et al., (2013a) mapped out three broad competing policy
directions regarding the forms of regulations that are deemed appro-
priate and the purpose for which they are to be maintained. They are
policies that regulate to facilitate; regulate to mitigate negative impacts;
regulate to stop and roll back large-scale agricultural investments. In
Ghana, agriculture plays a key role in the development, and successive
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governments have sought to modernise the traditionally predominant
small holding systems by integrating them into the markets of large-
scale schemes and the creation of an enabling an environment for pri-
vate investments (Amanor, 2010). There has been longstanding state
support for plantations in Ghana. Examples include the post-in-
dependence compulsory land acquisitions for oil palm and rubber
plantations- many of which are now privatised- to the promotion of
foreign direct investments in agriculture through market-based large
scale customary land acquisitions in contemporary times (Amanor,
1999; Tsikata and Yaro, 2011). For instance, in 2012, the Ghana
Commercial Agricultural Project (GCAP) was launched with the ob-
jective of ‘improving the investment climate for agri-business and de-
veloping inclusive Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs) and smallholder
linkages1 ’. To emphasise this,
‘modernizing agriculture' remains the overarching theme of Ghana's
agricultural policy as well as the new private sector development
strategy. It focuses a substantial role for the private sector in trans-
forming agriculture from a low-productivity subsistence-based sector to
one characterised by high-productivity, integrated value chains, and
extensive value addition. Government interventions are focused on the
enabling environment and other targeted measures to facilitate such
investment.
Similarly, in 2015 the ministry of food and agriculture made
available a list of public lands and priority crops earmarked for large-
scale investments while inviting partnership opportunities from in-
dustrialised countries. Many times, these ideas also resonate with tra-
ditional authorities2 who premise their expectations on jobs for the
youth. These have also been accompanied with measures aimed at
ensuring transparency and inclusiveness of local populations. Examples
include the state’s strengthening of land administration through regis-
tration, and certification, and the voluntary land investment guideline
formulated by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in 2015to pre-empt
and address challenges with land investments.
Generally, Ghana appears to incline towards the first two regulatory
tendencies of promoting land deals, but what does this mean for rural
working people affected by land deals? This study aimed to investigate
the effect of regulations intended to ensure responsible investments on
labour outcomes for local people, in particular, marginalised groups.
The study explored the experiences of farmworkers on an oil palm
plantation in Ghana and the capacity of existing land and labour reg-
ulations to ensure equitable benefits from land investments. It is im-
portant to note that the goal of this paper is not to present detailed
empirical evidence of wage labour relations on the oil palm plantation.
Instead, it is a critique of the existing regulatory environment for
governing wage labour and investments, while reflecting on the ex-
periences of the farmworkers in order to ground the discussion in first-
hand observations.
1.1. The politics of regulating to promote large-scale agricultural
investments
The tremendous media and research attention on large-scale agri-
cultural land acquisitions have contributed to a diversity of governance
strategies by policymakers, civil society organisations and researchers;
and at different political spaces- global, national and local levels.
Policies are also being shaped by debates that are shifting from sim-
plistic accounts of good (people) versus bad (investors) to more critical
and complex analyses of issues (Byerlee and Deininger, 2013; FAO,
2012; Fao, 2010; Margulis and Porter, 2013). Indeed one would hardly
find any fixed governance approaches, however, the three competing
tendencies: (a) regulate to facilitate land deals; (b) regulate to mitigate
negative impacts and maximize opportunities; and (c) regulate to stop
and rollback land grabbing, put forward by Borras et al. (2013) is an
appropriate starting point to understanding to the institutional aspects
of large-scale agricultural investments in Africa. Reiterating the caution
by Borras et al. (2013 pg168), 'these tendencies are not sharply defined
and fixed. Hence the use of the term 'tendency', and each is in turn,
internally variegated' and also influenced by broader political and
ideological contestations around the notions of economic growth and
development. These three regulatory approaches help to analyse the
policy directions of states while recognising the political shifts over-
time.
The tendency (A) of regulating to facilitate land deals is embedded in
administrative propositions to address the issues of effectiveness, effi-
ciency and transparency in land transactions (Borras et al., 2013;
Franco and Monsalve Suárez, 2018). Here, there is the recognition that
large scale agricultural investments are driven by the global demand for
food, feed and fuel. However, they are also considered favourable be-
cause of longstanding advantages, e.g. market adaptability and econo-
mies of scale of large operations (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). This
policy direction facilitates accumulation under transparent and parti-
cipatory institutions which checks on information asymmetries. Pro-
ponents promote land formalization programmes, public-private part-
nerships and property rights purported to secure investments and
reduce transaction costs for investors. They are also presumed pre-
conditions necessary to prevent failed deals, unemployment, and irre-
versible environmental implications (UNCTAD et al., 2010).
The tendency (B) of ‘regulating to mitigate negative impacts and
maximise opportunities’ recognises the inevitability of large land in-
vestments due to communities’ desire for investments amidst fiscal
limitations and the lack of trust in the state to spearhead such devel-
opments. Similar to tendency A, policy priorities emphasise the need to
ensure that investments are undertaken sustainably- have minimal ad-
verse effects on people and the environment (von Braun and Meinzen-
Dick, 2009). However, unlike the ‘strategic thinking underpinning the
first tendency which advances investments, this second current adopts a
more tactical approach- to address the urgent needs of poor people
whose livelihoods could be threatened by land deals (Borras et al.,
2008; La Via Campesina, 2007). At a period when the land rush lit-
erature was still primarily based on speculations, (Behrman et al., 2012
pg. 71) suggested that
‘If large-scale land investments are properly executed with appro-
priate attention to gender dimensions, land deals can provide
transformative opopportunities for both women and men through
the introduction of new employment and income generation op-
portunities, new technologies, and new services. Appropriately de-
signed land deals that include local women, as well as men in the
negotiations and compensation, may even aid in the distribution of
local resources in a more gender-equitable fashion. Investors also
stand to benefit from such gender-equitable land deals that consider
the full range of skills, labour potential, and knowledge of local
women and men’
In the past few years, human rights advocacy including the call for
decent labour standards (e.g. elimination of child labour, right to un-
ionisation, social security benefits, generation of new and higher-
paying jobs), land use rights, transparency, and the incorporation of
small-scale farmers in production and market chains of agribusinesses-
e.g. out-grower schemes, have all become prominent ways to address
land grabs (Beekmans et al., 2014; Bertram, 2012).
In stark contrast to the first two approaches, is the tendency (C) of
‘regulating to stop and roll back’ land deals. It represents a radical stance
against large scale investments. From this perspective, land deals ex-
pose rural people and peasants to dispossession and forced proletar-
ianization, eventually culminating in deprivation and poverty (La Via
Campesina, 2007; Moyo et al., 2012; Rosset, 2009). McMichael (2008,
p. 213) adds that beyond dispossession, is an equally crucial fact that
such investments tend to rule out the place for peasants, closing doors
1 http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?page_id=7036
2 Families and chiefs govern about 80 per cent of lands in Ghana
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to alternatives and re-moving peasants and their systems of production
from history. Similarly, others highlight their embeddedness in global
power asymmetries whereby investors as compared to local popula-
tions, become better positioned to advance their agenda and benefit
more under institutions of property rights (Margulis et al., 2013a,
2013b). Notably, radical agrarian justice organisations such as the food
sovereignty movement has been influential in proposing alternatives
through campaigns for agrarian reforms that support peasants agri-
culture instead of large scale investments- a popular declaration of La
via Campesina has been “Our Land is our identity, it is not for Sale.’
(Borras and Franco, 2012; La Via Campesina, 2007)
While all three tendencies recognise power asymmetries as a con-
straint to the developmental outcomes of land deals, they diverge on
the perceived sources of these power inequalities, and how to deal with
them. Whereas policy strategies that navigate towards the first two
tendencies show optimism that inclusive participation and transparency
could lead to positive outcomes, the latter stresses more on the ex-
propriating and coercive character of capitalist development which
makes it unlikely to trust participatory processes. Again, from outside
and within the third regulatory tendency, class, identity and ideological
tensions persist within radical agrarian and environmental movements
and the extent to which they represent the diverse interests of rural
people or peasants in different contexts also remains highly debated
(Bernstein, 2013; Edelman and Borras, 2016). A project may be de-
nounced globally and nationally but receive support from some groups
at the local level (Larder, 2015). For instance, contrary to the radical
demands of agrarian movements, in the Ghana case studied in this
paper, there is a persistent investment and employment desire that
supersedes a land grab narrative.
These regulatory responses, therefore, do not necessarily lead to
particular outcomes but requires evaluating what happens on the
ground concerning the specific political-economic context within which
they are implemented. Thus, it crucial to examine the political pro-
cesses of certain regulations and why they emphasise certain goals than
others (Steinmo et al., 1992). O’Connor (1973) argued that states have
a double imperative of maintaining power by promoting economic
growth through capital accumulation while at the same time, safe-
guarding their legitimacy. It is thus not surprising that in many African
states, including Ghana, the first two political tendencies are prevalent.
As illustrated earlier, successive governments in Ghana have been
promoting agro-industrialisation, foreign direct investments and agri-
cultural technologies to 'transform' smallholder production and com-
mercial-scale schemes for local development, thereby making large-
scale land investments attractive to the state (Teye et al., 2016). Several
land deals in Ghana have been supported and justified by chiefs on
account of securing jobs for the youth and providing necessary socio-
economic infrastructure in deprived rural communities (Ahmed et al.,
2018; Boamah, 2014). Recent land transactions have been primarily
between traditional leaders and investors, with the state playing a
secondary or covert role. Nevertheless, tensions often exist in the au-
tonomy and capacity of the state and traditional authorities to balance
these responsibilities to benefit different groups equitably (Fox, 2000).
In many instances, institutions operate within high power im-
balances (see Visser and Spoor, 2011). For instance, in Ghana, the ex-
tent to which people can hold the state accountable on land deals de-
pends on the land tenure system guiding the acquisition. Ghana’s policy
of ‘non-interference’ in customary and market-based land tenure
(Amanor, 2008) promotes capital accumulation without profound le-
gitimation pressures- revenue for the state, while investors also operate
under a laissez-faire business environment. Even though the state's non-
direct interference in customary land transactions empowers traditional
land institutions, it also relieves the state from excessive legitimation
pressures thereby complicating the balance of power in land transac-
tions and the ability to mitigate negative livelihood implications, e.g.
labour impacts.
The labour question draws attention to issues of livelihoods but also
the classical problem of proletarianzation, i.e. forced labour driven by
land dispossession (Marx, 1977; Scoones, 2009;). To adequately address
the labour question requires a balancing of analytical perspectives
around issues of agency and structure. In other words, the orientation of
regulations/institutions, the business models of investors, as well as the
desires of affected communitiesare all socially and politically con-
structed, and therefore should be seen as broad patterns of class
struggles around capitalist development in the countryside (O’Laughlin,
2002; Steinmo and Thelen, 2010). Labour casualisation, for instance, is
often associated with insecurity and low income (Yaro et al., 2017).
However, for those who consider it as a potential livelihood opportu-
nity, they emphasise the benefits of flexibility in allowing workers to
engage in more than one productive sector and even the possibilities of
technology transfer to small scale farms (Deininger and Xia, 2016). At
the same time, it could enable investors to hire and fire workers with
ease, make more elastic use of skills, introduce non-conventional work
arrangements and lower wages according to their business needs and
performance in ways that may not necessarily benefit workers (Arnold
and Bongiovi, 2013, p. 6). In effect, the struggles over incorporation
imply struggles over the character and orientation of labour institutions
and models of production, all of which affect the outcomes of and re-
sponses to land deals in both expected and unpredictable ways. The
study is, therefore situated in the interactions between class and live-
lihood struggles of farmworkers in a regulatory environment char-
acterised by structural inequalities.
1.2. Study approach and the main sources of data
One of the two main sources of data for this study is the labour
related experiences among workers on the Volta Red Oil palm planta-
tion in Ghana. It is affiliated with the infamous American owned Sithe-
Global Sustainable Oils (SGSO), popularly also known as Herakles
Farms, also operating in Cameroun. It started in 2008 as a pilot project
involving a 50 year lease of approximately 3750 ha of family lands
(semi-deciduous forests) belonging to 15 extended families (con-
stituting hundreds of family members) of the Ntrubo clan in the
Nkwanta South Municipality. In 2009, the company acquired a twenty
times bigger land size in Cameroun (The Oakland Institute, 2016). Not
long after, the land-owning families in Ghana began litigation on the
lease agreement, and thus it did not make economic sense for the
company to be at the forefront of the project3 - they concentrated their
attention to the Cameroon investment. Since 2013, the day to day op-
erations of the plantation has been managed by Ghanaians but under
the directorship of British investors4 of the Wyse Group UK5 who had
already established their presence in the oil palm sector in the adjoining
Kadjebi District as Volta Red Company limited – an oil palm processing
mill that was at the time, dependent on their 41 ha oil palm plantation
and an out-grower scheme6 .
Field reports indicate that since 2013, Volta Red took over the
Herakles farms/SGSO in Ghana and managing it concurrently with its
original investment.7 The target market for the product -oil palm - is the
local and the neighbouring West African markets as according to the
management. As a company, Volta Red employs approximately
300–350 people on the three investments- two plantations and the oil
palm processing mill. The study focuses on the approximately 2508 .
3 Interviews with the Project Liaison and landowners in 2018
4 resident
5 https://suite.endole.co.uk/insight/company/05665971-wyse-group-limited
6 From field interviews
7 Some reports indicate that director has taken over management of the
contested Herakles project in Cameroun see (https://www.greenpeace.org/
africa/en/blogs/1525/the-new-name-behind-the-threat-to-cameroons-forests/)
8 This is an upper limit from a workers list of 237, during my fieldwork I did
not get the actual numbers because of the casual and seasonal nature of the
work. In essence, some casual workers have contracts, and others do not
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workers at the Fankyenekor-Brewaniase plantation of 3715 ha in Fan-
kyenekor Brewaniase, previously owned by Herakles Farms. A quarter
of the workforce are migrant labourers from across the country and
neighbouring Togo who moved specifically to work on the plantation,
while the rest commute from the three main catchment areas around
the planation- Brewaniase, Abuburuwa and Dodo-Tamale.
I conducted field visits in Ghana between February 2018 and March
2019. I adopted a qualitative-dominant mixed methods approach,
conducting a socio-economic and employment survey with 200 farm-
workers, informal conversations and interviews with random commu-
nity members, former employees, and farm workers (80 people). I also
carried out gender and task-based focus group discussions with the
workers and made use on my physical access to the farm to observe
their working conditions. Other key informant interviews were con-
ducted with the management, seven out of the eight supervisors, the
land-owning families and their family heads, traditional authority, and
(local) government officials, officers of the Ghana Agricultural Workers
Union (GAWU). Between October and December 2018, I gathered and
reviewed national (Ghana) policy documents including the constitu-
tion, the Labour Act, 651 of 2003, as well as other (inter)national soft
laws and the voluntary guidelines on land deals. The findings from the
policy and legal documents are central to the discussions in the sub-
sequent sections.
As an overview, several institutions govern labour in Ghana. The
Constitution serves as the main legal umbrella for employment- safe-
guarding the right to work; protecting the health, safety and welfare of
all persons in employment; and setting some fundamental working
conditions such as equal pay, limited working hours and holidays. The
constitution guarantees workers' rights to unionization and prohibits
forced labour. Specifically, the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), and the
Labour Regulations, 2007 (LI 1833) stipulate the legal framework for
employment in line with the constitution of Ghana. It addresses the
scope for the protection, conditions of employment, and unionisation
while dedicating sections to women, youth and persons with dis-
abilities. Part (X) of the labour Act, 2003 focuses on casual and tem-
porary workers (Republic of Ghana, 2003). Here, the act emphasizes
the 'fair' and non-discriminatory practices of remuneration. There are
other complementary laws such as the Persons with Disability Act 2006
(Act 715), the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1987 (PNDCL 187), The
National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766) and the Internal Revenue Act,
2000 (Act 592), all of which should in principle, enhance the admin-
istration the labour markets.
The Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations serves as the
overarching body for governing labour. In 2015, it formulated the na-
tional employment policy (Republic of Ghana, 2015b) in line with the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards. The policy ad-
dresses four core issues of increasing employment generation, quality of
employment, labour productivity, and enhancing governance of labour
markets. It has decentralised and devolved departments and commis-
sions responsible for the day to day administration of labour at the local
level. In 2015, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture also designed the
Community/Investor Guidelines for Large-Scale Land Transactions. The
guideline sets a framework for cooperation among investors, commu-
nities, and government and suggest their roles in the five stages of in-
vestment: preparation, initial engagement of stakeholders, impact as-
sessment, negotiation and consent, and monitoring and enforcement of
agreements (Republic of Ghana, 2015a). In principle, governance of the
agricultural workforce in Ghana draws on the above regulatory and
institutional frameworks, yet to what extent are they able to adequately
secure the rights of farmworkers?
2. Job creation rhetoric under a laissez-faire investment
environment
I have indicated earlier that one of the key assumptions for the
promotion of farmland investments in Africa and other developing
regions is the employment generation potentials. By this, policymakers
put faith in institutions to ensure that agribusinesses provide jobs in the
localities within which they operate. There are, however, several
challenges with this assumption, especially within the Ghanaian con-
text. First, there are no hard laws or national regulations that specifi-
cally enforce employment creation on transnational large scale farms.
During my fieldwork, the failed promises of employment was the big-
gest disappointment for the affected families and communities. This
situation reflects the non-concurrence between verbal promises of in-
vestors and the actual content of the lease agreement9 bearing the the
stamp of the land registry. Per the lease document, the survey, and
interviews with families, the company is upholding its stated obliga-
tions of employing at least one affected family member provided they
have the requisite skills and qualifications. At least thirty-five (35) of
the workers identified as direct proletariats, but this represents a very
low percentage of the hundreds of resident nuclear families that con-
stitute the fifteen extended families affected by the land deal. Likewise,
most of the clauses in the lease document are vague and non-binding on
the company. An example is one that ties their social responsibility to a
condition of being able to acquire and plant about 10,000 more hec-
tares of oil palm in the Volta region of Ghana. However, even at the
time of the study (10 years after concession), the company was only
maintaining just about a 1000 ha (less than a third) of its existing
concession – so in principle, the community cannot hold them ac-
countable. It appeared to be struggling to stay in business, and some
workers confirmed that in the previous years, it was at the verge of
collapse – some pointed political-ecological reasons similar to the in-
cidences of failed farm projects in Ghana (Ahmed et al., 2017; Tsikata
and Yaro, 2014; Yaro and Tsikata, 2013). Thus, not only have ex-
pectations of wage employment been unmet, but also the hopes of in-
direct jobs.
Besides, the existing regulatory institutions in Ghana do not have
the autonomy and capacity to dictate the business model of investors
while at the same time, the Free Zone Act (1995) provides extensive
and generous financial incentives to foreign investors.10 Although cer-
tain regulations like that regarding environmental impact assessments
and land registration/certification could be guaranteed, it falls outside
the priorities or jurisdiction of state institutions to determine and
monitor how they run their businesses- be it labour intensive, me-
chanised, out-grower schemes or even the types of crop to be cultivated.
Hall et al. (2017), provide rich insights into the emerging patterns and
trends of the labour implications of different models, highlighting the
diverse opportunities and risks for different social groups. For instance,
the extent of mechanisation or labour intensity may depend on several
factors, but primarily, investors would not compromise on the financial
returns of their businesses. Promoters of oil palm plantations often
emphasise job creation, yet oil palm requires an average of one worker
per five hectares which is lower than other crop types such rubber
(World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2011).
Although large-scale farms could have potentials for extensive job
creation, economic viability and ‘social sustainability’ do not necessa-
rily cohere, but no one seems to be responsible for this gap in logic.
Critics of land deals often emphasize the perils of surplus labour re-
sulting from redundancy. However, this case shows an even more
complicated situation: the plantation work is labour intensive and
needs workers to be able to maintain the remaining 2500 ha, yet
management is compelled to cut down cost to remain in business;
people (especially men) want jobs, but the poor conditions deter them;
women have minimal job opportunities; there are high rates of ab-
senteeism from casual workers, yet without commensurate sanctions
due to labour supply constraints; management seems to be planning
9 . They were written by a private legal firm in Ghana for the company
without the involvement of the land-owning families
10 See https://gfzb.gov.gh/index.php/incentives/
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towards increased mechanisation in the long term, which could further
reduce labour opportunities.
The voluntary guidelines are well intended to address or pre-empt
irresponsible investments, but unfortunately, in many cases, such soft
laws are already too late and not binding. Many communities have
already become victims to contentious land acquisition processes that
may require extreme and specialised interventions to revert their pro-
cess or their implications. In the Herakles-Volta Red land deal, the in-
itial processes of consultation, and the content of the lease agreement-
e.g. a four - year moratorium on the payment of rents, and absence of
binding clauses on employment creation raise many questions. Yet, the
general expression from the affected-landowners is that akin to a spilt
milk: they are bound to the existing lease agreement prepared by
lawyers of the company, and family heads are waiting for its 50 year
expiration date to take necessary actions – a situation which the youth
hope to change sooner than later, through organised action. Moreover,
the guidelines are vague, issues on labour are less discussed as com-
pared to land tenure, and their recommendations pay more attention to
participatory consultations rather than power dynamics. For instance,
the Community/Investor Guidelines for Large-Scale Land Transactions
in Ghana (hereafter the Ghana Guideline) treats communities, investors
and the government as though they are stakeholders with equal inter-
ests and power. In the guideline,
A proposed best practice is for investors to create a sequential plan
for business development, clearly identifying the timing of the se-
quential phases, the amounts and types of land needed in each phase, as
well as the expected crops, returns, and employment projected in each
phase.
Doing so should help create win-win possibilities for both investors
and communities. That is, communities can then ascertain the long
term demand for land in order to avoid initial acquisitions that are
larger than necessary (Republic of Ghana, 2015a, p. 8).
In an interview with the affected families, almost all of them ex-
pressed regret to agreeing to the land transfer, but their major worry
has not been because of dispossession11 rather, the failed promises of
decent jobs. Although the Ghana guideline recommends employment
creation as a component of every large-scale agricultural investment, it
is discussed from the angle of compensation and non-monetary benefits
that should accompany land deals, rather than being pursued as an
'obligation' of the investors' or a 'right' to the affected communities.
Such propositions do not necessarily guarantee that recommendations
are upheld by investors nor may they even be feasible in the context of
many developing countries characterised by political, social and eco-
nomic instabilities. Indeed, there are differences among investors de-
pending on the scale, extent and duration of establishment, the models
of production and tenure agreements. However, these individualised
processes leave the livelihood needs of marginalised communities to the
‘goodwill’ of investors.
3. Agricultural wage labour and the institutional bypasses
Transcending the soft guidelines to the well-institutionalized laws
and regulations that guide employment relations, where is the place of
wage farmworkers? A critical gap in the existing labour institutions in
Ghana is that they do not have binding responsibilities in the agri-
cultural sector. For instance, the Department of Factories Inspectorates
Division obtains its mandate from the Factories, Offices and Shops Act,
1979 (Act 328), obviously excluding agricultural work. The National
Labour Commission, which was birthed by the enactment of the Labour
Act, 651 of 2003, has as its mission.,
‘to develop and sustain a peaceful and harmonious industrial
relations environment through the use of effective dispute resolution
practices within the context of the law, promotion of cooperation
among the labour market players and mutual respect..’
Hence, in the events employer-employee disputes on plantations,
parties cannot rely on the labour commission to perform its core
function of addressing complaints. . Although per the mandate of the
labour department, general enforcement of labour standards apply to
the agriculture sector, their scope of operation is too broad and all-
encompassing (Akorsu, 2010). Thus, it came as no surprise after in-
terviews at the local government institutions, that they knew very little
about the operations on the plantation, except the company's tax
commitments. The national labour laws and regulations have also been
designed to be primarily applicable to industries and services. The 2003
labour Act (Act 651) emphatically eliminates agricultural workers from
the coverage of the law even though they happen to be among the most
marginalized groups in the country. Under the section on ‘special pro-
visions relating to temporary workers and casual workers’, the Act does
not only prioritize investors over workers – ‘employer may hire a
worker on terms that suit the operations of the enterprise’, but also
states that the ‘section does not apply to, pieceworkers, part-time
workers, sharecroppers, sea-going personnel in the fishing industry who
are wage earners’.
Labour on the Herakles- Volta Red plantation is characterized by
piece rate, labour mobility across tasks, seasonal layoffs, six-month
casual contracts with no guaranteed progression, and casual workers.
About seventy per cent (70%) of the labour force are casual and tem-
porary workers and approximately nine out of every ten women are
casual workers. Conscious of their insecurity and the lack of appro-
priate regulatory interventions, the workers diversify their livelihoods
with other occupations. More than eighty per cent (80%) of the workers
were engaged in what they considered as equally important activities
such as petty commodity trading, farming and transport services. Many
of them do these additional jobs not because casual work is inherently
favourable to them- it is far below their knowledge of decent employ-
ment.
Again, in Ghana, occupational health and safety of workers are
under the Workmen's Compensation Law 1987 (PNDC 187), and the
Factories, Offices and Shops Act, 1979 (Act 328) but these also fall short
in addressing farmworkers issues. The former is a discretionary direc-
tive which is also more favourable to employers than workers. As the
name suggests, the latter prioritises industry, thus limited in ensuring
the health and safety for workers in the agricultural sector- including
farm, fisheries and forestry (Rep. of Ghana, 2014). Meanwhile, plan-
tation farmworkers are often exposed to diverse forms of injuries, ac-
cidents and health risks that go unaccounted for in these laws. Most
large-scale production schemes in Ghana rely heavily on chemicals that
are manually applied by farmworkers. For example, chemical sprayers
expressed concern about inadequate protective clothing and irregular
health checks. Women who engage in the picking of loose palm fruits
with bare hands are also susceptible to nail infections and reptile at-
tacks, while many harvesters and pruners also complained of chronic
chest and neck pains. Casual (semi) skilled workers complained about
the risks of operating faulty machinery and without licences. The reality
is that, although many of these farmworkers double as own-farmers, the
plantation-style of production requires continuous learning which
sometimes takes a while to master. In a study on sugar cane plantations
in Mozambique, O’Laughlin (2017), found similar incidences whereby
the intensification of work exposed farmworkers to severe dehydration,
eye infections and respiratory difficulties and long-term health condi-
tions like chronic kidney disease associated with dehydration. In effect,
the agricultural sector12, which employs the largest share (44.7%)13 of
11 with the exception two extended families that lost all their land to the
acquisition
12 Including forestry and fisheries
13 2016 figures from http://mofa.gov.gh
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the total labour force in Ghana is not fully represented in national
legislations.
In the few policy circles where labour regulations and institutions
apply to farmworkers, institutions struggle with fragmented and over-
lapping functions and mandates. Since 1985, when the Department of
Factories Inspectorate was removed from the Labour Department, there
has not been any clear distinction in their responsibilities. Regarding
issues of occupational health and safety, other government institutions
such as the Ministry of Health, Environmental Protection Agency, and
Fire Service have several overlapping mandates in terms monitoring
(Akorsu, 2010). Under such circumstances, there could be either du-
plication of efforts, or no job done. Other practical and technical
challenges hinder the ability of labour institutions to function effec-
tively. The various labour organisations are inadequately staffed and do
not have the necessary logistical support to carry out inspections and
enforcement of standards and labour market research (Akorsu, 2010;
Oya, 2013a, Oya, 2013). In a study of the Indonesia Palm Oil sector, Li
(2017) also demonstrate how sometimes companies can evade un-
favourable reports through their alliances with politicians and other
bureaucrats; a situation that resonates in the Ghanaian context. It is for
such reasons that de Schutter (2011) cautions against an overestimation
of the capacity of the governance structures to facilitate land deals for
local development.
4. Institutional legitimation of status quo and repression
De Schutter (2011, p. 258) argued that research that investigates
whether land investments represent an improvement from the status
quo ante do not provide a holistic understanding of impacts. Policy-
makers and researchers need to go beyond here-and-now- narratives to
ask if rural lands could not be used more productively, equitably and
sustainably under structural, institutional and agrarian reforms that
distribute land to smallholders. Akram-Lodhi (2007) and Whitehead
and Tsikata (2003), also have questioned 'win-win' assumptions in the
promulgation of formal land administration programmes such as titling,
certifications and land registries and how these regulations usually
perpetuate existing inequalities in land access and control. In a similar
regard, the issue of labour also calls for attention, yet mostly under-
represented in these debates. The agrarian question of labour – who
does what, and who gets what, in relation to the social divisions of
labour and the distribution of income are fundamental issues for un-
derstanding capitalist development in the countryside (Bernstein,
2010). Asking these questions help unpack how people are integrated
and how dynamics produce social forces with different political possi-
bilities (Bernstein and Pitt, 1974, p. 522; Henry. Bernstein, 2010).
To some extent, the income of the farmworkers is partially14 guided
by the minimum wage regulations in Ghana. The introduction of
minimum wage dates back to the 1950s when Ghana became in-
dependent from British Colonial rule. Since the enactment of the labour
Act 2003 (Act 651), the payment of minimum wage is binding on
employers even though in practice not many uphold it, particularly in
the private and informal sectors (Kumah, 2017). During the economic
crises in the period between 1970 and 1990, where cost-cutting struc-
tural adjustment programmes advanced, so was the rise in debates on
the distortion effects of minimum wage on an otherwise efficient labour
markets. Once again, the minimum wage has grabbed policy attention,
but now as an effective measure to address poverty and as a means of
social protection for vulnerable groups. The assumption is that it pro-
vides a guarantee for low-wage-low-skill workers to earn “decent”
wages and sustain at least a subsistence standard of living. All the same,
others are sceptical about its effects on real income and employment in
many developing country contexts (Obeng, 2015, p. 86).
In the past three years, the minimum wage in Ghana increased
annually by 10 per cent, yet this represents a rise from just GH₵8 to GH
₵10.6 per day (approx. 1.5 to 2 USD15), which is woefully low to even
maintain a subsistence living as compared to many developed countries
where households can afford decent living with minimum wage earn-
ings. Evidence from the study on the Herakles-Volta Red oil palm
plantation showed that even though the farmworkers were being paid
almost fifty per cent higher (GH₵14.04) than the 2018 national
minimum wage of GH₵ 9.68, it was still challenging for farmworkers to
maintain decent living for themselves and their households. Of course,
per the organisation of labour (piece rate) and tasks on the plantation,
the impacts are differentiated among the working groups - men,
women, the ageing, landed and the less-landed. Nonetheless, even for
those who are better positioned to work long hours or engage in lu-
crative labouring tasks on the plantation, high incomes are accom-
panied by negative trade-offs- especially on their healthcare. These
centralised wage regulations do not reflect the social and cultural dy-
namics of rural spaces with large household sizes, extended family re-
sponsibilities and educational aspirations that force farmers into be-
coming semi-proletariats.
It is worth noting that most of the peasant farmworkers16 did not
deny the benefits of having access to regular income when compared to
their earnings from their peasant farming. Many of the male workers
interviewed indicated their dependence on wage income to invest (in
labour and agrochemical inputs) and possibly to expand in their own
farms, as well as to provide shelter (mostly traditional mud houses) for
their households. Wage income also means a lot to women, most of
whom have become the 'duty bearers' of their children's education. At
the same time, many male youths considered themselves temporary
workers, saving their income to pursue higher education with the hope
of future work in the industry or service sector. However, not only do
these well-being benefits from the meagre wages demonstrate the poor
initial conditions of the workers, but it also shows how benefits are
usually unequally distributed among different groups. A review of the
attendance rates on the plantation showed that women farmworkers
appear to be more dedicated to their jobs than men, yet ninety per cent
(90%) of them are casual workers, and they receive the lowest wages
(See Baumgartner et al., 2015 on their economic analyses of employ-
ment outcomes in Ethiopia). It was therefore not surprising to find a
high prevalence of debts among the workers (40 % of them). The ex-
panded cash economy has also increased borrowing - casual workers
hope to migrate to permanent contracts mainly to have access to bank
loans17 which would otherwise be difficult to have as farmers, and in
general, regular access to income is serving as guarantee for credit,18
e.g. from petty commodity traders, co-workers and family members.
This creates a sort of continuous debt-bondage situation (Brass, 1986),
partly influenced by their dependence a non-living wage.
Again, the national labour act regulation does not address issues on
delay in payment of wages- this remains a problem even for the public
sector. Depending on their past employment backgrounds, some
workers considered it normal, or even better than their previous
workplaces. One of the farmworkers noted,
‘people complain about the delay in payment because they have not
worked in any other paid jobs. I worked in another private sector
before, and it is better here at Volta Red. The situation is that the
money is not ready. It is a company, and we have to understand
14 The minimum wage is a benchmark above which the company has sets
daily piece rate, but as explained earlier, because there are no regulations to
protect pieceworkers, productivity rates and output standards could be arbi-
trary and as such the labourers often complain about being overworked.
15 As of September 2019
16 Especially men who farm only up to one acre of tenant or own family lands
17 per calculations (from interviews) workers who had taken loans from the
bank were paying interests of over 60% within 18 months
18 Credits for a wide range of things including non-self-produced items like
fish, meat, oil roofing sheets, education and health needs
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them, they explain to us about the delay every time.'
The workers’ poor access to information on the existing labour laws
coupled with their structural disadvantages imply that many do not
even know what their rights are, and how to pursue them. One out of
every three people I interviewed wanted to know about the laws on
progression from casual to permanent contracts- oftentimes assuming
that their employer is treating them unfairly because of their long years
of work under casual contracts.
The combination of fear, misinformation, spatial remoteness, and
differentiated livelihood needs affect their ability to mobilise around
their working conditions (Gyapong, 2019). A farmworker narrated,
‘we attempted some form of a strike when there was a delay in
payment, but our supervisors advised us against it. There are also
times when some people do not follow what has been planned. They
go to work even when we have decided against it.'
Permanent workers agitated about the lack of an enabling en-
vironment to unionise. Casual workers and those in security were also
puzzled about being prevented by management to join the Ghana
Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) under the rhetoric of the ‘com-
pany’s internal security’. Although the law allows even casual workers
to form unions, it is apparent that these provisions need to be accom-
panied by the necessary institutional support for marginalised groups.
Officials at GAWU registered logistical and human resource constraints
in their efforts to mobilise the workers. At the same time, prioritising
uncommitted semi-proletariat casual workers who are geographically
distant from the capital and other oil palm plantations in the south,
presents practical challenges for GAWU which is under-resourced.19
The farmworkers, therefore, resort to everyday individual forms of
political reactions to deal with the unfavourable working conditions.
This is often expressed through non-compliance, deception, ab-
senteeism and continuous production on their own farms to ensure their
basic food security/sovereignty and also to supplement their incomes.
These actions are, however, not inherently empowering given the trade-
offs, particularly the negative implications for their upward mobility in
the labour structure. In summary, the existing institutional setting is
premised within a continuum of maintaining the status quo to the point
where it even becomes repressive to farmworkers. Although farm-
workers harness some here-and-now livelihood improvements, long-
term benefits from wage work in agriculture is questionable.
5. Concluding reflections: rethinking labour regulations and
benefits from agriculture
This paper adds new insights to land deals, provides empirical
evidence on the regulatory and policy environments within which large
scale agricultural investments take place, and examines the implica-
tions of labour regulations for the rural working poor- particularly wage
labourers in Ghana. The governance framework for land investments
and wage labour are largely characterised by absent, illusively present
and repressive institutions that are influenced by both global and do-
mestic factors. In the past few decades, land policies and redistributive
reforms have come to the centre stage of development, and they ought
to be accompanied by labour reforms as well. How land and labour are
combined, are the fundamental distinguishing features of plantations or
large-scale farms (Evans, 1995, p. 155), and this necessitates that at-
tention is given to the labour question as much as it has been done in
the context of land tenure issues. Farms are not mere units of agrarian
production but embedded in power relations and social institutions that
are deeply rooted in people's lives (du Toit, 1994, p. 380). Not fully
exploring labour-related issues has implications for how we interpret
and politically intervene in rural agrarian societies that are affected by
large scale land acquisitions in an era of resource grabs.
Again, evidence from this study reinforce arguments that are critical
of optimistic narratives about the employment creation prospects of
large scale land investments; notably, when there is not a strong busi-
ness case to demand labour. Even when jobs have been promised under
‘consultative’ agreements, it may be difficult to realise the expectations
of decent jobs. The regulatory environment in Ghana demonstrates how
and why the institutions that are expected to protect workers are either
non-existent or inadequate. Particularly, the public sector and industry-
related labour policies are prevalent. They either exclude or leaves to
the margins, agricultural wage labourers. Examples in Ghana include
the Single Spine Salary Structure20 applicable to civil servants, and the
2003 labour Act (651) which makes no provisions for farmworkers.
Thus, several of the existing regulations tend to legitimise oppression
and inequality instead of protecting marginalised groups. Ghana’s la-
bour sector requires substantial policy reforms - new laws and
amendments to the ‘industrial' mandates of the labour commission and
also ensuring that policies are backed by extensive rural labour market
research.
It is essential to have agriculture-specific legislations that deal with
labour issues on both large and small-scale farms. If regulations are to
be effective, the legal rights for agricultural workers need to be secure.
Workers remain poorly informed about their rights. It is crucial that
farmworkers’ access to education, information and training on laws,
rights and processes of unionisation are improved. Although companies
require flexibility in labour hire, casual labour should not be the norm
in land access agreements. At the same time, legal provisions for un-
ionisation must be supported by policies and programmes that build the
capacities of these “hard to organise casual workers". Organised action
should not be limited to domains of conventional trade unions but with
also support from NGOs, the formation of co-operatives, and other al-
liances and networks that are practical and relevant to their rural
contexts in order facilitate leadership training. Some of these practices
are leading to significant progress for undocumented, migrant and ca-
sual agricultural workers in some Western countries where social and
migrant worker centres have been created by trade unions in coalition
with various associations to create awareness and inform workers on
issues such as occupational health, gender violence, and rights (Molina
and Guardiancich, 2017). Certainly, farmworkers in Ghana are not
alone in their struggles for better terms of incorporation on plantations
as similar issues have been reported in other developing economies
(O’Laughlin, 2017; Ouma, 2018). From a global viewpoint, farm-
workers could also benefit from international governance institutions
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to address the huge
vacuum in agricultural labour regulations.
Nevertheless, before any large-scale investment is to be justified, the
‘why' question from the perspectives of landowners and those who
appear to be attracted to wage labour should not be ignored. Regulatory
measures that centralise information asymmetries tend to overlook the
desperation which may underline people’s ‘willingness' to give out their
lands and fall into full or semi-proletarianism (O’Laughlin, 2002). For
example, many of the female farmworkers are forced into wage labour
because the societal and gendered norms that shape domestic respon-
sibilities such as the provision of food, education and health care.
Closely linked, is the need to address discriminatory agricultural sector
policies that leave some small-scale farmers with very few alternatives.
Farmers’ lack of access to inputs such as seeds, farm tools, water, fer-
tilizers, agricultural extension services, among others, and unstable
19 Interview with a GAWU official in March 2019. Officials from GAWU also
indicated that the Union has been instrumental in other well-established
plantations in Ghana, and in some instances, they have even helped organised
oil palm oil out-growers, but they still face difficulties in reaching out to all
plantations, especially private businesses.
20 The Single Spine Salary Structure introduced in Ghana in 2010 marked a
key labour reform in the recent past to address wage disparities http://
fairwages.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Government-white-paper.pdf
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markets are key contributing factors to their choices. In Ghana, there is
a considerable state provision that goes into cocoa production through
subsidies21 while other smallholder farmers in food crops such as maize
and cassava are not equally supported22 . At the same time, prices for
cocoa beans are imposed, and food crop producers also do not have
guaranteed price floors for their produce like those for milk and other
commodities in many western countries. Farmers move in out of sea-
sonal poverty, and desperation forces them to them make constrained
choices regarding land transfers, which also inhibits their agency as
farm workers on large-scale farms. As such, if there be any regulations,
they have to tackle first, the initial conditions of host communities.
Effective investment and labour regulations should, therefore, reflect
the contested spaces of unemployment, underemployment, rural-urban
inequalities, small-scale agriculture, livelihoods and power relations
-within which these investments are expected to take place to ‘benefit'
the poor.
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